Abstract Since the 1960s, anti-immigration parties have emerged in many established European democracies. Some of them -for example, the German Republikaner and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium -have been treated as pariahs by other parties. Others -for example, the Lega Nord in Italy and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid -have not. Why is this? In this paper I argue that other parties are likely to ostracize an anti-immigration party if they do not need to cooperate with it anyway. They are even more likely to do so if they can convincingly make the case that its ideologies are outside agreed standards of acceptability. Through logistic regression analyses based on data concerning 31 Western European antiimmigration parties, I demonstrate that a party's size and ideological profile are major factors accounting for its treatment as a pariah. The findings offer important insights about the applicability of the commonly used strategy of ostracism, which has previously been shown to affect coalition building in established democracies.
Introduction
In established democracies, some parties are excluded from government coalition building through so-called 'anti-pacts' (for example, Martin and Stevenson, 2001, pp. 36-37) . Indeed, some parties are even systematically ruled out from any political cooperation by all the other relevant actors in the system. Among Western European anti-immigration parties, for example, the former Flemish Bloc (VB) in Belgium was treated as an outcast (for example, Maddens and Fiers, 1998) , whereas the Northern League (LN) in Italy has been treated as any other party by its right-wing competitors. Historically, several kinds of parties have been ostracized, such as Communist parties (Tannahill, 1978, pp. 19-36) , whereas others have entered party systems without facing exclusion strategies, such as Greens (for example, Poguntke, 2002) . Why are some parties ostracized while others are not?
This question is an important one, as the systematic boycott of political parties can have many implications. To the extent that the exclusion is meant to prevent a party from entering coalition governments, it can be effective. Potential government coalitions that include parties stigmatized as 'antisystem' are less likely to form than other combinations (for example, Martin and Stevenson, 2001, p. 46) . However, the effects of ostracism may not be restricted to those effects that the political actors who are responsible for the ostracism intended. For example, scholars have argued that the exclusion of a party can lead to the radicalization of the targeted party and of those members of the electorate who have sympathy for it (for example, Van der Brug and Fennema, 2004) . The systematic boycott of political parties also raises the pressing question of whether such inter-party strategies should be permitted in a democracy and, if so, under what circumstances -a question that is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
In this paper I argue that other parties are likely to ostracize an antiimmigration party if they do not need to cooperate with it anyway. They are even more likely to do so if they can convincingly make the case that its ideologies are outside agreed standards of acceptability. In order to make my argument, I first elaborate two rival theories from which I derive three hypotheses. In a next step, I identify a set of parties on the basis of the empirically grounded concept of the 'anti-immigrant' or 'anti-immigration' party (see also Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug et al, 2000; Golder, 2003) , and classify the other parties' political responses to each of these parties as either 'ostracism' or 'no ostracism.' Following pleas for more comparative research on anti-immigration parties (for example, Minkenberg, 2000, p. 170) , I then go on to test my hypotheses along with rival explanations for the variation in responses to the existence of the anti-immigration parties drawing on data concerning 31 Western European anti-immigration parties. In the conclusion, I place the main findings in a wider perspective.
The Exclusion of Political Parties
In the relevant literature, established parties' political responses to antiimmigration parties have often been framed as responses to 'extremist,' 'extreme right,' 'anti-system' or 'pariah' parties (for example, Downs, 2001; Pedahzur, 2004; Van Donselaar, 2004; Capoccia, 2005) . In my view, however, the concept should be generalized to all parties. This is because, at least in theory, any party can be ostracized in appropriate circumstances. After all, several kinds of parties (communist, socialist, fascist, and so on) in various established democracies faced responses that were similar to those now being confronted by various anti-immigration parties.
Let me begin from the notion that every party has to choose its attitude towards every other party. An important aspect of this attitude is whether the party cooperates politically with each of these other parties. As an extreme option, a party can systematically rule out cooperation with a specific other party. In that case, I will refer to the party's attitude to the other party as 'ostracism. ' A party can be ostracized by any other party at any level -the local, regional, national or supranational level. In this study, only the national level is taken into account. The reason for this is that this is the level at which 'first order elections' (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) are held and at which ostracism is therefore bound to have its largest influence.
The Determinants of Ostracism: A Rational Choice Approach
Why would a party ostracize a specific other party? Rational choice theory (RCT)-based approaches to party politics typically assume that parties are unitary, boundedly rational actors with policy, office and votes as their main goals. As these are scarce resources, parties have a stake in minimizing the number of competitors for these resources. Thus, they are interested in effectively taking out rivals -for example, by ostracizing them. Irrespective of whether or not this is a conscious motive of party leaders, they have an incentive to try and ostracize as many of their competitors as they can. 1 However, there is a (context-specific) maximum to the number of rival parties that a party can safely boycott without jeopardizing its own chances of achieving its short-term or long-term goals. As a consequence of the uncertainty associated with electoral outcomes, they cannot always be sure as to whether or not they need specific other parties to cooperate with politically in order to reach these goals. Thus, parties are assumed to ostracize all other parties unless they need them in terms of political cooperation.
When do parties tend to cooperate with each other? Whether or not parties join government coalitions with each other is typically found to depend on two factors (for example, Laver and Schofield 1998; Martin and Stevenson 2001) : first, the extent to which each party has influence in a country's politics; and second, the extent to which the parties are ideologically close to one another.
In a similar vein, it can be argued that whether or not two parties join less formal collaborative coalitions will largely depend on the same two aspects.
There are valid arguments against a mere rational choice approach, however. Ostracism is a rare phenomenon in Western Europe, for instance, which seems in contradiction with the notion that rational choice approaches would predict that any party ostracized all others unless they need them. In Britain, for example, Labour is unlikely to need more than a handful of the other parties in the foreseeable future yet does not ostracize all others.
The Determinants of Ostracism: A 'Defense of Democracy' Approach
The reason that the targeting parties usually give for the ostracism of anti-immigration parties is that these parties have 'reprehensible' ideologies. One familiar example is the 1989 'cordon sanitaire agreement' by which the leaders of all parties represented in the Belgian parliament committed themselves to making no political arrangements with the (then) Flemish Bloc (VB). According to the party leaders involved, the reason for signing the Protocol was that the VB did not acknowledge fundamental democratic principles and human rights (Damen, 1999, pp. 6-7) . As another case in point, the permanent marginalization and ridiculing of the Centre Democrats (CD) by all other Dutch politicians was commonly justified on the claim that the party had 'racist' ideologies (for example, Fennema and Maussen, 2002) .
This argument is rooted in the idea that democracy should be kept safe from ideologies and movements that undermine it. This dovetails with the reasons usually given in the relevant literature for the exclusion of particular parties from membership in government coalitions in postwar Western Europe (Budge and Keman, 1990, pp. 10-11) . The concepts of 'defending democracy' (for example, Capoccia, 2001; Pedahzur, 2004) , 'militant democracy' (for example, Minkenberg, 2006; Erb and Minkenberg, forthcoming) and 'intolerant democracy' (for example, Bale, 2007) not only inspired the designers of Germany's new constitution in the aftermath of World War II, but also contemporary thinkers. On websites of (government-sponsored) Belgian civil society organizations such as 'Hand in Hand' and 'Charta '91,' the cordon sanitaire around the VB is justified by referring to the fall of the Weimar Republic.
2 In this light, it seems reasonable to assume that when applying an ostracist strategy, party leaders act out of a genuine concern for the quality of democracy. 3 However, there is a strong case to make against a purely defense of democracy-oriented account of ostracism. The notion that ostracism is some natural response of actors who find specific ideologies reprehensible requires the assumption that it would be unthinkable to do otherwise. This entails that the party ostracizes the other party from the start, and that there is no debate among the party elite to ostracize the party. This seems to rarely happen. For example, the VB in Flanders (for example, Delwit and De Waele, 1998, pp. 231-234; Maddens and Fiers, 1998, p. 248 ) and the Republicans in Germany (More, 1994) have been ignored for years before action was taken. And parties' decisions to ostracize the respective anti-immigration parties have been heavily debated on several occasions in Flanders (for example, Damen, 1999, pp. 11-15) as well as in Germany (for example, Backes and Mudde, 2000, p. 459) . Thus, the defence of democracy may not be their only motivation either. Yet, it is perfectly possible that both perspectives explain part of the variance in the occurrence of the ostracism of political parties.
The Determinants of Ostracism: Three Hypotheses I present three hypotheses, two based on an RCT perspective, and one on an alternative, norm-oriented perspective. Based on RCT, it can be argued that all parties have an interest in excluding every other party from competition unless they need to cooperate with it in order to reach their goals. This largely depends on two factors. First, it depends on the degree of power that the party has in parliament. The more power a (parliamentary) party has, the more likely other parties are to form collaborative coalitions with it, such as government coalitions (for example, Laver and Schofield, 1998; Martin and Stevenson, 2001) , and therefore the less likely the party is to be ostracized by others. I therefore formulate the first hypothesis of this study:
Hypothesis 1: The less powerful a party, the more likely it is that other parties will ostracize it.
Second, it depends on the ideological distance between the two parties. The closer two parties are in ideological terms, the greater the chances of cooperation between them -at least in terms of government coalition formation (for example, Laver and Schofield, 1998; Martin and Stevenson, 2001) . It has been demonstrated that this also holds, for example, for far right parties (De Lange, 2008) . This would mean that ideological closeness to a particular party prevents another party from being ostracized by it. 4 The idea that the ostracism depends on ideological differences between the various parties involved would also explain why some types of party are ostracized while other types are not. If anything, the often-targeted anti-immigration and communist parties have in common that they hold views that are further away from mainstream thinking than other parties such as the (also relatively young) green parties, which have rarely been targeted. This justifies the formulation of a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The larger the distance between a party's ideological position and that of another party, the more likely it is that the one will ostracize the other.
It should be remembered that only specific types of party have been ostracized, such as anti-immigration and communist parties. This is a far cry from the rule derived from RCT that a party will, in principle, ostracize all others. Why is it that only some parties are ostracized? As already mentioned, a possible explanation for this may lie, in line with the reason typically given by politicians in the Netherlands for their ostracism of the CD, that it holds ideologies that are reprehensible, or even dangerous (for example, Fennema and Maussen, 2002) . In this line of thinking, some parties spread ideologies that are too dangerous to be tolerant of. This explanation also dovetails with the notion of the 'defense of democracy,' that potentially dangerous parties should be kept down by any means in order to safeguard democracy. This leads to the theoretical expectation that a party's extremism is conducive to its being ostracized by other parties, which can be stated as a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: A party with extremist ideologies is more likely to be ostracized than a party without extremist ideologies.
Control Variables
There are three kinds of additional factors that other parties might take into account in their decision to ostracize an anti-immigration rival: contextual effects, their own characteristics and those of the targeted party. A contextual variable that is expected to play a role is the effective threshold to enter parliament. The likelihood of ostracism is expected to vary according to differences in electoral systems. In countries where the effective threshold to enter parliament is low, such as Finland, ostracism is a more important tool in preventing new parties from becoming succesfull at the polls than in countries where the established parties are already protected from challengers by a high effective threshold -for example, Britain. The easier it is for a new party to gain visibility and legitimacy through representation in parliament, the more the established parties will be inclined to keep unwanted parties out by other means, such as a cordon sanitaire. For this reason, I will control for the effective threshold in the political system. Second, the characteristics of the other party may affect its propensity to ostracize an anti-immigration party. A relevant difference may be whether it has conservative roots or originates from a party family other than the conservatives. The reason behind this is that conservative parties may be ideologically closer to anti-immigration parties, as these parties are perceived as relatively more nationalist, 'tougher on crime' and more prone to defending a country's culture and traditions than, for example, parties with a liberal or Christian-democratic tradition (Gallagher et al, 2006, pp. 246-247) . As a consequence, pressures from supporters or the party cadre may discourage the leaderships of conservative parties from ostracizing anti-immigration parties (Bale, 2008, p. 463 makes a similar argument).
Finally, anti-immigration party traits may be of importance as control variables. In particular, it may be important to distinguish between parties that were xenophobic from the outset, and already existing parties that have gradually become anti-immigration. As new parties cannot build on already existing organizational structures, legitimacy, visibility and electoral support, they will suffer more from their isolation than established ones. To the extent that other parties base their strategies on expectations concerning its effects, a new party is therefore a more likely target than one that has already existed for some time. The targeting party may also run electoral risks if it decides to ostracize a rival that has already established an existence and has attracted a share of the electorate. The Progress Party (FrP) in Denmark, for example, had already won 13-16 per cent of the national-level vote at previous elections when in the late 1970s its leader Mogens Glistrup made his first attempts to mobilize on the immigration issue (Andersen and Bjørklund, 2000, pp. 204-205) . In this case, the other parties had an incentive not to ostracize the party, because by doing so they might have alienated those voters who had voted for the FrP in the past. In addition, it is less costly for other parties to begin a boycott of a new party than of an existing party with which they are likely to have struck deals before, as other parties will have difficulties in convincingly arguing that an existing party has become so 'evil' that it should be ostracized. It is therefore expected that an anti-immigration party is more likely to be ostracized by its competitors if it is a new party.
Case Selection
I take into account as many political contexts as reasonably feasible in order to circumvent small-N problems that have plagued the scarce previous research on the topic conducted thus far (Downs, 2001 (Downs, , 2002 ). Yet, in order to reduce all sorts of problems of comparability over time and across countries, I limit this study to one type of parties, anti-immigration parties in Western Europe. I categorize each party in 13 political systems in 12 Western European countries 5 as an anti-immigration party, as an anti-immigration party's largest mainstream competitor, or as 'other' party. The largest party on the right side of the political spectrum that is not an anti-immigration party is classified as the main right-wing party. Anti-immigration parties are defined as parties that have a very restrictive position on the immigration issue. This is operationalized as a mean position higher than 8 6 on a 0-10 immigration restriction score, measured in Lubbers' (Lubbers, 2001, pp. 27-32) expert survey. Note that the selection of parties is very similar to that in other research on anti-immigration parties (for example, Gibson, 2002; Golder, 2003; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug et al, 2005) . In this way, 31 anti-immigration parties are selected.
Data and Method
In order to test the hypotheses, a data set was built on the basis of various sources. A substantial part of the data employed in this study is derived from several expert surveys. Most importantly, an expert survey was conducted in the course of this study in order to measure the dependent variable. The data derived from the expert survey were cross-validated by a review of the relevant literature. 7 Expert surveys have been widely used and have proven to have many advantages over similar techniques such as mass surveys and elite studies, four of which Mair points out (Mair, 2001, p. 24) . First, the fact that the respondents are country experts and have been working in the field gives the survey a certain weight and legitimacy. Second, the experts can base judgments on a party's actions at the time of the survey rather than on the basis of past behavior. Third, expert surveys make it possible to generate highly comparable data. Finally, the results of this type of survey can be precise and numerical, which can sometimes be useful.
The use of this kind of survey is not unproblematic, however. The main disadvantage of the expert survey approach is that the media and party sources on which the experts base their judgments may be biased. As a consequence, the results of the expert survey will be biased as well. It is, however, not possible to correct for this potential bias other than by cross-validating the results.
I test the hypotheses by way of two sets of logistic regression analyses. In each of the analyses, the effects of several independent variables will be tested, three of which pertain to one of the three main hypotheses. In the first set of analyses, the aim is to explain for each of the 31 anti-immigration parties the response (ostracism or no ostracism) of its largest mainstream competitor. The dependent variable is a dummy that distinguishes between cases in which the largest right-wing party treats its anti-immigration rival as a pariah and those in which it does not.
The response of the mainstream right is crucial for the anti-immigration party. After all, so far as anti-immigration parties have collaborated with other parties, it was with rightist ones. However, an exclusive focus on the main right-wing parties would mean that information on the behavior of other parties is not taken into account. A second set of analyses will therefore focus on the attitudes of each party towards the anti-immigration party in its system. However, this detailed information is only available for the 20 still existing anti-immigration parties for which there are data from the 2004 expert survey mentioned above.
Because in France, Germany, Italy, Norway and Switzerland there are several anti-immigration parties, some of the other parties appear twice or three times in the data set. In Germany, for example, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)'s attitude towards the Republicans is included in the analysis as well as its attitude towards the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). This yields a total number of 107 observations concerning the attitudes of 75 different parties towards 20 different anti-immigration parties in 13 political systems.
In Models 4-6, the statistical significance of the effects yielded by the variables mentioned above will be assessed on the basis of clustered robust standard errors, which will compensate for the fact that the observations are not independent of each other, but clustered by country.
8 Because of the small number of observations (N ¼ 31 and N ¼ 107, respectively), the available degrees of freedom allow for no more than five variables to be included in the model. The variables will therefore be included in the analysis in blocks of three to five variables.
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The Dependent Variable
The response of each established party to the existence of an anti-immigration party in its party system was qualified as 'ostracism' or 'no ostracism.' This was done in two ways, by expert surveys and by a literature review. Country experts were asked whether the mainstream right party ostracized the anti-immigration party or not -see the Appendix for the details and results of this expert survey. Each anti-immigration party for which an absolute majority of experts indicates that it was systematically boycotted by the main right-wing party is coded as ostracized. The combination of these methods leads to the following coding list of the dependent variable -see Table 1 .
The values of the dependent variable in the first set of analyses relate to the point in time at which the decision was made whether or not to ostracize the anti-immigration party. Thus, they pertain to the year of the party's first national-level election as an anti-immigration party, just as those of the independent variables -see the last column of Table 1 for the time point for each party.
In the second set of analyses, the values of the dependent variable are derived from the 2005 expert survey (see above) and therefore reflect the situation in June 2004. 10 A particular party's attitude towards an anti-immigration party Source: results expert survey -see Appendix.
Parties beyond the pale in its system is classified as 'ostracism' if a majority of experts have indicated this in the survey. 11 To continue the example of Austria in the previous paper, all 16 experts chose 'no' in answer to the question of whether or not the People's Party (Ö VP) systematically boycotted the Freedom Party (FPÖ ) at the national level in June 2004. By contrast, 10 out of 16 experts indicated a 'yes' in connection with the same question on the attitude of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ ) towards the FPÖ . Thus, the attitude of the Ö VP towards the FPÖ is categorized as 'no ostracism,' whereas the SPÖ 's attitude towards the FPÖ is classified as 'ostracism.' The descriptive analyses of the dependent variable are shown in Table 2 .
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The Independent Variables
For each of the hypotheses, an additional variable is included in the analysis. See Table 2 for descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables.
The concept of the power of the anti-immigration party in the first hypothesis is measured in terms of the proportion of seats in the national parliament held by it. This is in accordance with the relevant literature on coalition formation (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Martin and Stevenson, 2001 ) as well as voting behavior (Tillie, 1995; Van der Brug et al, 2000) . The values of this variable range from 0 to 18.57 per cent of the seats.
The distance 13 between the main right-wing parties' ideological positions and those of their anti-immigration competitors are added to the analysis in order to assess the second hypothesis. The party positions are measured in terms of left and right (rescaled on a 0-100 scale) by way of various expert surveys (Dodd, 1976; Sani and Sartori, 1983; Castles and Mair, 1984; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Lubbers, 2001) . The data employed come from the survey conducted closest in time to the anti-immigration party's first participation in national-level elections -see Table 1 . Obviously, the average ideological distance in the first set of analyses, including the center-right and anti-immigration parties only, is smaller (17.89 on a 0-100 scale) than that of the second set, in which all parties are included (37.63). The range of observed values varies from À24.40 to 92.60.
In order to test the third hypothesis, a dichotomous variable is included that distinguishes neo-liberal xenophobic parties from neo-Nazi and authoritarian xenophobic parties.
14 This classification is obtained from Carter (2005, pp. 50-54) , who classifies anti-immigration parties as 'neo-Nazi,' 'authoritarian xenophobic' or 'neo-liberal xenophobic.'
15 Where anti-immigration party ideology plays a role, neo-Nazi parties are expected to be the most likely targets when it comes to ostracism strategies by the established parties. This is because they reject democracy, parliamentarism and pluralism completely (Carter, Fuchs and Klingemann, 2000, p. 16) . Authoritarian anti-immigration parties, which undermine the legitimacy of the existing constitutional state by calling for more state intervention and demanding substantial reforms that would curtail the rights and freedoms of individuals (Carter, 2005, pp. 41, 51) , are also more likely to be ostracized than the group that is, somewhat confusingly, called 'neoliberal' anti-immigration parties. These parties can be considered the most 'enlightened' group of anti-immigration parties, in that they take the individual and his or her rights and freedoms as the starting point of their ideologies. Moreover, they tend to be in favor of more extensive democracy, which they usually express in calls for institutional reforms and referendums (Carter, 2005, pp. 41, 51 ). This will make it more difficult for other parties to justify possible ostracism, as such calls are not at all considered beyond the pale. Indeed, earlier research has shown that large shares of the electorates in established democracies support these ideas (Donovan and Karp, 2006, p. 677) . Data on the effective electoral threshold in each country are derived from Carter (2005, pp. 149-151) . The effective threshold in Finland (0.5 per cent) is this variable's minimum value. The maximum is the (estimated) value of 37.5 per cent in Britain and France (except for 1986) -see Carter (2005, pp. 149-151, 154) .
Furthermore, a dummy is included, coding conservative mainstream parties as 'one' and other parties as 'zero.' The classification by Budge and his collaborators was used for this (Budge et al, 2001) .
Finally, a characteristic of the anti-immigration parties is included. A dichotomy is created between parties that are new (coded 'one') and parties that already existed at the time that they became xenophobic (coded 'zero'). Ten parties gradually became more anti-immigration. 16 All the other 21 parties under study were already staunchly xenophobic at birth. However, 11 of them were breakaways from, or successor parties to already existing antiimmigration parties.
17 These parties could all build on existing structures and/or the media attention of already well-known politicians from other parties, in contrast with the 10 remaining parties. Only the latter group is classified as 'new parties.' I will now turn to the results of the first set of analyses, those pertaining to the major right parties only (N ¼ 31).
The Results Pertaining to the Largest Mainstream Competitors Only
My first model only includes the power of the anti-immigration parties (Hypothesis 1), their ideological distance to their main competitors (Hypothesis 2), and the three control variables -see Table 3 . It is not van Spanje SE=standard error.
Parties beyond the pale surprising that the fit of the model is not satisfactory, with pseudo R-square (Nagelkerke's) ¼ 0.23, a chi-square (DF ¼ 5) of 6.90 (not significant at the P ¼ 0.05 level) and 84 per cent of the cases correctly predicted. 18 Yet, the coefficient of the Hypothesis 1 variable is significant at the Po0.05 level in the predicted direction. The larger the proportion of seats of an anti-immigration party, the less likely it is to be marginalized.
The impact of the Hypothesis 2 variable is also in the predicted direction (positive) but just fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This may be due to the small number of observations. Moreover, the variation in ideological placement of the parties included is small as well, because only the anti-immigration parties and their main rivals are included, which are all right-wing parties. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed, whereas Hypothesis 2 is not.
None of the control variables in Model 1 has a significant impact. Neither the effective threshold nor whether or not the party is conservative seems to matter. Neither of these variables even yields an effect that is in the expected direction. Whether or not a party already existed at the time it contested its first national-level election as an anti-immigration party does not have any substantial impact either.
Model 2 includes, instead of the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 variables of Model 1, a variable on anti-immigration party ideology (Hypothesis 3).
This model also performs poorly, with a pseudo R-square of 0.14, a Wald chi-square statistic (DF ¼ 4) of 8.78 (not significant at the P ¼ 0.05 level) and a rate of 71 per cent correctly predicted cases. Like that of the power variable (Hypothesis 1), however, the impact yielded by the party ideology variable (Hypothesis 3) is in the predicted direction (negative) and significant at the P ¼ 0.05 level. Again, the effects of the three control variables do not reach commonly used levels of statistical significance. In fact, the first and third control variables yield effects that are not in the theoretically expected direction.
The control variables are therefore not included in Model 3. This model includes the variables that pertain to the three hypotheses only. It performs better than the first two, with a Wald test statistic that is significant at the P ¼ 0.05 level and a pseudo R-square of 0.31. The joint assessment of the three hypotheses results in one significant effect: the more powerful the antiimmigration party, the less likely it is that it will be ostracized (Hypothesis 1). Simulations based on the CLARIFY software (King et al, 2000; Tomz et al, 2001) facilitate the interpretation of the marginal effects. Analyses on the basis of Model 3 predict that if an anti-immigration party is not represented in the national parliament (which holds for 22 out of 31 of them), its probability to be ostracized by its largest mainstream competitor -holding all else constant on their means -is 80 per cent. If the party holds the maximum observed share of seats (18.57 per cent), this probability falls to a mere 6 per cent.
Model 3 correctly classifies 25 out of 31 cases (81 per cent). In two cases, antiimmigration parties were ostracized whereas Model 3 does not predict it. These are the Norwegian Fatherland Party (only 4 per cent chance of ostracism) and the Sweden Democrats (43 per cent). These parties were ostracized notwithstanding their moderate ('neo-liberal,' in Carter's terms) ideologies.
In four other cases, the model predicts ostracism where the party was not ostracized. These were the Belgian parties National Front (62 per cent chance of ostracism), Party of New Forces (62 per cent) and Flemish Bloc (63 per cent), as well as the Dutch People's Union (67 per cent). These are all parties with extremist ideologies and without strong representation in parliament at their first election as anti-immigration parties. All three Belgian parties faced ostracism later on, at their second national elections as anti-immigration parties. The Dutch People's Union was legally repressed, and its successor parties were heavily marginalized. The Dutch mainstream right's moderate political response to the Dutch People's Union may be influenced by the fact that the legal prosecution of the leader and his party had left the party in complete disarray (see, for example, Bouw et al, 1981) .
Thus, the conclusion so far is that party size (Hypothesis 1) explains some of the variance in the ostracism of political parties, whereas neither the ideological distance between parties (Hypothesis 2) nor ideological extremism (Hypothesis 3) has a substantial impact. I now turn to the second set of analyses, which includes the full pallet of parties and is therefore more adequate for the assessment of Hypothesis 2.
The Results Pertaining to all Parties
In the following, I reassess the hypotheses on the basis of a slightly different data set, containing the political responses of all the 75 parties in 13 political systems to the anti-immigration parties in their systems. I will repeat the analyses of the first set. Thus, I first estimate a model that includes the two variables pertaining to Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the three controls. See Model 4 in Table 4 for the results.
Judging by the pseudo R-square (0.38), Model 4 performs better than the three models estimated earlier. The Wald chi-square (significant at the P ¼ 0.001 level) indicates a good fit, and the model correctly predicts 90 out of 107 cases (84 per cent). 19 The empirical evidence does not support the first hypothesis. The Hypotheses 1 and 2 variables have impacts that are in the predicted directions and border on statistical significance at the Po0.05 level. The controls do not yield any significant effect.
If I replace the Hypotheses 1 and 2 variables by the Hypothesis 3 variable, a significant coefficient appears. Model 5 predicts that extremist parties are more The analyses also support the second hypothesis. The Hypothesis 2 variable yields an effect that is in the predicted direction (significant at the P ¼ 0.05 level). This means that the more right-wing a party, the less likely it is to ostracize the anti-immigration party in its system. CLARIFY simulations make clear that a party that has the same ideological profile as the antiimmigration party in terms of left and right will ostracize the party in 61 per cent of cases. This probability goes up to 96 per cent as the ideological distance between the parties increases to the observed maximum of 92.6 on a 100-point scale. 21 The fact that Hypothesis 2 shows its impact in Model 6 and not in Models 1 and 3 is not surprising. I now look beyond the largest mainstream competitors only and therefore add a lot of variation to the left-right party positioning.
Like in Models 2 and 5, the anti-immigration party ideology variable (Hypothesis 3) has an impact, significant at the P ¼ 0.01 level, in Model 6. The model suggests that a 'neo-liberal' anti-immigration party is 10 times less likely to be ostracized than a 'neo-Nazi' or 'authoritarian' anti-immigration party. According to estimations based on CLARIFY, the difference in terms of probabilities is 30 percentage points.
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Model 6 correctly categorizes 81 out of 107 cases (76 per cent). In 22 cases, parties have ruled out political collaboration with a particular party whereas the model predicts otherwise. The majority of these cases (16 out of 22) can be found in Scandinavia, where parties tend to boycott competitors that are relatively moderate, such as the Progress Party in Norway or the Sweden Democrats. Five other cases pertain to Switzerland, where the 'neoliberal' Freedom Party and People's Party are boycotted by several rivals. The remaining case is that of the Communist Refoundation in Italy, which refuses to cooperate in any way with the current government party Northern League.
Conversely, there are four cases in which anti-immigration parties are not ostracized although Model 6 predicts it. These deviant cases concern the attitude of the Austrian People's Party towards the Freedom Party, the Green Left and Socialist Party towards the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, and the attitude of the New Flemish Alliance towards the Flemish Bloc. In Austria, the People's Party had a strong incentive not to exclude the Freedom Party, because doing so would, in practice, mean forcing itself to a long-term 'Grand Coalition' with the Social Democrats (cf. Art, 2006) . In the Netherlands, the leaders of Green Left and Socialist Party did not rule out all cooperation with the LPF, and Green Left leader Rosenmo¨ller even accepted an invitation to join Fortuyn in a public debate in March 2002 (Van Praag, 2005, p. 29) . The absence of ostracism may be due to the fact that Fortuyn rapidly became so popular in the polls after his announcement in August 2001 that he would go into politics that it would have been next to impossible to marginalize him in any case. Finally, for the New Flemish Alliance it was difficult to join the other parties in their expressing of disgust of the Flemish Bloc. This is because the New Flemish Alliance had close ties to the Bloc, which broke away from the party in 1978.
Additional Control Variables
Three other control variables have been tested in additional analyses (not shown) that could not all be included in the models presented because of the small number of observations. First, a contextual variable that might be expected to influence the mainstream party's behavior concerns the country's levels of immigration. After all, the other parties have little to fear from an anti-immigration party if there is scarcely any mobilization potential on the immigration issue. Although the perceived immigration levels can substantially differ from the actual levels of immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2005) , it can be assumed that some level of immigration has to exist for a party to mobilize on it. In addition, it might be expected that the actual level of immigration corresponds to a certain degree with the potential source of mobilization on the issue. In contexts where this source of mobilization is small, an emerging anti-immigration party will be less likely to face ostracism. If, by contrast, immigration is massive, generating a large mobilization potential, the other parties will be more inclined to fall back upon ostracism in order to prevent the new rival from exploiting this potential. In other words, the higher the immigration influx in a country, the more likely an anti-immigration party is to van Spanje be ostracized by its competitors in that country. When a measure of the annual level of immigration in the year of the xenophobic party's first participation in national-level elections is included (Eurostat, 2001) , however, it yields no significant effect and does not change any of my conclusions in this paper.
Second, it can be argued that parties' position on the immigration issue will affect their propensity to exclude a rival that campaigns on an antiimmigration platform. If a party perceives an electoral threat related to its moderate immigration position, it has an incentive to prevent the issue from becoming salient. Parties can manipulate the perceived salience of conflicts in their electoral competition with anti-immigration parties (for example, Meguid, 2005; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2007) , and one of the many ways (Schattschneider, 1975 (Schattschneider, (1960 , p. 69) of doing so is by delegitimizing the main messenger, the anti-immigration party. This would mean that the less restrictive the immigration policy position of the competitor is, the more likely it is to ostracize an anti-immigration party. In order to check this, these immigration positions are included, measured by way of an expert survey conducted by Lubbers (Carter, 2005, p. 50) , who collected data concerning the situation in 1990 and 2000. However, adding the immigration positions of the other parties does not substantially change my results.
Finally, it can be hypothesized that the increasing salience of the immigration issue over time has provided a growing incentive for other parties to exclude those rivals that aim to mobilize on this issue. In the 1960s immigration may not have provided a very fertile ground for anti-immigration parties in Western Europe, whereas in recent years it has become relatively easy for political entrepreneurs to mobilize on this issue. It might therefore be expected that the other parties have become more inclined to keep these parties down by any means. 23 The inclusion of a variable indicating the year in which the party participated in national-level elections for the first time as an anti-immigration party does not have any significant impact, however, and does not affect my findings.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to explain the occurrence of the ostracism of political parties in established democracies from two different angles. Based on a rational choice perspective, I find that the weaker a party is, the more likely it is to be boycotted by others (Hypothesis 1). In addition, the less ideologically close two parties are, the more likely they are to boycott each other (Hypothesis 2). These findings are in line with a rational choice perspective on party behavior. In addition, I have found empirical evidence for the thesis, based on a defense of democracy approach, that parties ostracize a particular other party if it has extremist ideologies (Hypothesis 3).
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The reasoning behind the defense of democracy hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) may seem circular at first sight. After all, the parties that are ostracized may radicalize as a result (Van Spanje and Van der Brug, 2007) . However, although parties may, and sometimes do, gradually change their ideological basis, a switch from authoritarian xenophobic or neo-Nazism to neo-liberalism, or vice versa, is quite a radical one. None of the 31 parties under study has done so -and probably none of them ever will. It is therefore unlikely that the ostracism has shaped these parties' ideologies to this extent. Note that the way in which parties are classified on the basis of their ideology (see Carter, 2005 ) is completely unrelated to ostracism.
The results of this paper offer an important insight about the possible strategies that parties have at their disposal in their competition with other parties. Given findings in earlier research that coalitions with parties that are effectively stigmatized as 'anti-system parties' are less likely to form than other combinations (for example, Martin and Stevenson, 2001, p. 46) , this finding can contribute to coalition building theory as well.
A question that remains is to what extent the decision to ostracize a specific other party can be captured in a rational choice framework and to what extent the perspective of the defense of democracy is more adequate. Perhaps the two approaches would, in the end, arrive at similar answers to the question of why a party ostracizes some other party. Seen from a rational choice perspective, a party risks electoral losses and intra-party conflict if it has difficulties in explaining to voters why it excludes another party. If, by contrast, the established party can credibly accuse a particular other party of ideologies that are widely perceived as unacceptable, the exclusion is likely to be seen as legitimate. In that case, the party leadership will probably seize the opportunity and pursue a strategy of ostracism. In sum, it is likely that a party will use the strategy of exclusion (RCT perspective) only when the targeted party provides some rationale or excuse for this strategy in its ideologies (defense of democracy perspective). This paper has concentrated on anti-immigration parties only. There are no reasons to expect that the findings would be completely different for other parties such as communists. The types and flavors of communist parties may have an important impact on the likelihood of being ostracized by other parties. The so-called 'Eurocommunist' line independent from the Soviet Union, might, for example, have helped the Italian Communist Party (PCI) to avoid ostracism by the socialists, and to allow them to cooperate with the Christian Democrats in the late 1970s.
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My findings may not only explain why some parties were ostracized while others are not, but also why some kinds of party, such as communist parties, van Spanje were treated as outcasts while others, such as green parties, were not. Parties that cannot be linked to any ideologies that are widely perceived as reprehensible at the specific time and place are not likely victims of ostracism.
Finally, the results of the analyses suggest that crucial steps for the development of a radical party are, first, making its program more acceptable and, second, distancing it from -often violent -extremists at an early stage. In the end, it seems that the leaders of the challenging parties hold the key to their own acceptance. 
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Notes
1 It may be argued that the aim to monopolize the markets for office, policy and votes would violate the rules of the game, because if there is only one party in the country, it may no longer be considered a democracy. Discussion about the qualification of this aim as undemocratic or undesirable lies beyond the scope of this paper, however. The point is that any party has an interest in minimizing the number of competitors. 2 See www.vaka-handinhand.org and www.charta91.be. 3 Even many political scientists seem to start from the notion that the extreme right is a force in society that should be fought against (for example, Van Donselaar, 1995; De Witte, 1997; Schikhof, 1998, p. 156; Damen, 2001; Downs, 2001; Husbands, 2002; Eatwell and Mudde, 2004) . 4 Another reason why, from an RCT perspective, other parties would ostracize a particular other party is that the party attempts to mobilize on an issue over which the other parties are internally divided. Core to the electoral campaigns of anti-immigration parties, for example, is the issue of immigration. Other parties' members and supporters may be divided over this issue, so that the rise of an anti-immigration party and, related to this, increased salience of the immigration issue would cause internal divisions within the other parties. The other parties may therefore opt for the ostracism of the anti-immigration party in an effort to prevent the immigration issue from gaining salience. After all, a 'conclusive way of checking the rise of conflict is simply to provide no arena for it' (Schattschneider, 1975 (Schattschneider, (1960 .
Unfortunately, it is difficult to observe, or estimate, latent intra-party conflict dimensions. It is therefore nearly impossible to rigorously test a hypothesis holding that parties ostracize a particular other party in order to prevent latent conflict within the parties to emerge. Because of the problems mentioned, such hypotheses will not be tested in this paper. 5 In accordance with the relevant literature (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1996) Belgium is considered to contain two separate political systems, Flanders and Wallonia. 6 The cut-off point of 8 was used because none of the parties founded before the immigration issue became salient in Western Europe (around 1965), has ever taken up a more restrictive position on the 0-10 immigration restriction score. 7 The list of the relevant literature by party is available upon request from the main author of this manuscript. 8 In Models 1-3, the use of clustered robust standard errors is not necessary, as there is no significant clustering by country -see note 24. 9 The assessment of three additional control variables will be reported after the presentation of the main results. 10 The situation of the MSI-DN is an exception to the rule that the 2004 results are taken. This is because the Italian party system has radically changed after the collapse of several main parties in the early 1990s. Like those of the parties in the first set of analyses, the values of the dependent variable pertaining to the MSI-DN therefore are not those from the 2004 expert survey but based on a literature study. Leaving out the case of the MSI-DN does not affect my conclusions in this paper. 11 The fact that the judgments of the still existing anti-immigration parties necessarily pertain to the situation in each country in 2004, when the survey was conducted would be problematic if the responses of mainstream parties varied, measuring them at a different point in time. This is because this would have an unknown impact on the results. However, party responses can be assumed to vary only very little -if at all -over time, just like parties adjust their policies only incrementally (cf. Budge, 1994) . Parties that have already collaborated with each other, or at the very least co-existed, will find it difficult to convincingly argue that the other party should be ostracized. Conversely, it is very costly for a party to change an elaborate ostracizing strategy once it has been put in place. There is therefore no reason to suspect that the results of the analyses in this paper are substantially affected by the time point at which the responses of mainstream parties were measured. 12 As can be seen from the table, 52 per cent of the largest mainstream competitors ostracized their rivals at their first national-level elections as anti-immigration parties, whereas the overall occurrence rate of ostracism in 2004 is 75 per cent. The difference between the two figures is mainly due to the higher propensity of left-wing parties to ostracize anti-immigration parties compared to right-wing parties. 13 Strictly speaking, this figure is not a distance but a difference. This variable can thus have negative values. This is more realistic, as some main right parties are more right-wing than their anti-immigration rival, which would result in a positive value if a distance variable were used and a negative value in case of a difference variable. A difference variable therefore takes into account relevant information that the distance variable does not take into account. 14 The classification of parties on the basis of ideology alone could be misleading. After all, the parties are categorized on the basis of the documents they produce and statements they make. If one looks beyond the party platform and studies what the party officials do, a different picture may arise. Parties tone down references to elements in their ideologies that are widely considered to be 'not done' in an attempt to avoid stigmatization by other parties or political actors. In contemporary Western Europe, this can be expected to be especially the case for ties to neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist and other (currently) illegal organizations, or with (currently) illegal acts such as holocaust-denial, anti-Semitism or political violence. Hence, what may determine the other parties' propensity to ostracize an anti-immigration party is not only whether its ideology is within acceptable limits, but also whether the political behavior of the party leader and that of its members is acceptable. However, it is nearly impossible to classify the behavior of a party independently from the political response (ostracism/no ostracism) that it faces. This will therefore not be pursued here. 15 Three parties that meet the three criteria were not included in Carter's study, as she does not consider them 'extreme right ' (2005, p. 9) . These parties, the True Finns (PS), the former List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands and the Swiss People's Party (SVP), are all classified as 'neo-liberal xenophobic parties' on the basis of the material provided by these parties on their websites (perussuomalaiset.fi/true_finns.html; lijst-pimfortuyn.nl; www.svp.ch). All three parties refer to the protection of the individual against the state and call for more democracy in the form of referendums. 16 These are the Progress Party in Denmark (Andersen and Bjørklund, 2000, pp. 204-205) , its Norwegian homologue (Arter, 1992, p. 364) , the Austrian Freedom Party (Luther, 1992, p. 297) , the Flemish Bloc (Husbands, 1992, p. 137; Ignazi, 2003, p. 132) , the Swiss People's Party (Gentile and Kriesi, 1998, p. 136) and Car Party in Switzerland (Niggli and Frischknecht, 1998, p. 184) , the National Democratic Party of Germany (Mudde, 2000, p. 29) , the National Front in France (Van Donselaar, 1995, p. 223; Carter, 2005, p. 29-30 ) and the Italian Social Movement (Elbers and Fennema, 1993, pp. 41-44; Griffin, 1996, p. 132; Ignazi, 1996, p. 707; Lubbers, 2001; De´ze´, 2004, p. 24) and Northern League in Italy (Ignazi, 2003, p. 59 figure. 22 That is, 64 per cent against 94 per cent chance of ostracism, which fall outside of each other's 95 per cent confidence intervals. 23 The decision to ostracize a party in a country could depend on earlier decisions against other parties. For example, the exclusion of one anti-immigration party may induce the decision to ostracize a second anti-immigration party when it emerges. The small number of cases does not allow for a rigorous check for such effects, however. An alternative reason is that in recent years it may have become more acceptable to react to anti-immigration platforms by way of exclusionary strategies. Thus, the more recently a party was a first-time participant in the national elections on an anti-immigration platform, the more likely it is to be ostracized by its largest mainstream competitor. 24 The two data sets used in this chapter contain data on multiple levels. Analyses show that the first data have no multilevel structure and therefore hierarchical modeling is not needed (findings available upon request). The second data set, by contrast, consists of two levels, country (N ¼ 13), and observation (N ¼ 107) levels. Thus, the assumption of independent observations is violated. Hierarchical linear modeling is required to account for this violation (Hox, 2002) . The results obtained by way of hierarchical linear modeling are very similar to the ones presented in Table 4 . Results are available upon request. In sum, taking the multilevel structure of the data into account does not substantively change the results. 25 This said, in the case of the communist parties, the main factor was arguably an external one, namely the Cold War. Political pressure from the United States, on which most Western European countries were economically and military dependent in the aftermath of World War II, was too heavy to speak of a real choice that the established parties had in their stance toward their communist rivals. In combination with the fear of a Communist take-over, as happened, for example, in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the decision of other parties to ostracize their communist rivals is not surprising. Thus, the ostracism of political parties is arguably a product of the combination of external and internal political pressures.
field of party politics in the 13 polities mentioned in this paper. They were carefully selected on the basis of the websites of universities and academic institutions in these polities. The over-all response rate of 39 per cent is comparable to similar expert surveys (for example, Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Lubbers, 2001 ). The number of responses varies from 7 in Belgium to 19 in Britain and Germany. The question was as follows (the example pertains to Austria).
In some party systems, one or several parties are treated as outcasts by (some of the) other parties. In this case, other parties in the system systematically refrain from any political cooperation or alliance with them. This refusal to co-operate can manifest itself in the electoral and/or in the parliamentary arena. In the electoral arena, the other parties might refuse to collaborate in the form of joint press releases, or refrain from electoral alliances with these parties. In the parliamentary arena, the other parties may refuse any joint legislative activity with these parties, or deny them a place in administrative or executive positions.
Please consider the party system at the national level in June, 2004. Could you please indicate for each of the parties listed below whether it treated (Table A1) Concerning the anti-immigrant parties that had ceased to exist before the expert survey was conducted (2004) , no data were available. Therefore, a survey of the experts in the relevant countries was conducted, asking the same question as in the survey mentioned above. In each country, two highly qualified experts gave their opinion on the political response of the mainstream party based on the conceptualization mentioned above. The results are shown in Table 1 of this paper. Note that the relevant literature that was reviewed did not include the work of any of the experts that were asked about the parties that had ceased to exist in 2004.
